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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E 0 F U T A I-1: , by and 
through its ROAD COI\l!MIS-
SION, 
Appellanc 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY PUBLIC 
BOARD OF EDUCATIOI\T, 
Respondent. , 
Case No. 
9424 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
By reason of the respondent's failure and refusal 
in its brief to meet the issues and questions of law 
germane to and raised in this interlocutory appeal, and 
due to new matters set forth in the brief of the Board 
of Education not discussed in the initial brief of the 
State Road Commission, it is deemed appropriate and 
expedient to file this reply brief in order to amplify 
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and expatiate the grounds for reversal of the lower 
court's order denying the State Road Commission's 
motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
IN REPLY TO POINT I OF THE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION'S BRIEF, THE LAWS OF 
UTAH ARE SILENT AS TO THE PAY-
MENT OF COMPENSATION FOR THE 
CHANGE IN USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY 
AND ITS TRANSFER FROM ONE 
AGENCY OF STATE TO ANOTHER. 
(A) CHAPTER 34, TITLE 78, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, HAS APPLI-
CA ~ION ONLY TO "PRIVATE" PROPER-
TY, PURSUANT 'TO ARTICLE I, SEC-
TION 22, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION. 
POINT II. 
T'HE CASE CITED BY THE RESPON-
DENT IN ITS BRIEF DOES NOT BEAR 
UPON T'HE MERITS OF THE ISSUE 
RAISED IN T'HE CASE AT BAR. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
ARGUMEI\JT 
POINT I. 
IN REPLY TO POINT I OF THE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION'S BRIEF, THE LAWS OF 
UTAH ARE SILENT AS TO THE PAY-
MENT OF COMPENSATION FOR THE 
CHANGE IN USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY 
AND ITS TRANSFER FROM ONE 
AGENCY OF STATE TO ANOTHER. 
(A) CHAPTER 34, TITLE 78, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, HAS APPLI-
CATION ONLY TO ''PRIVATE'' PROPER-
TY, PURSUANT 'TO ARTICLE I, SEC-
TION 22, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION. 
The brief of the Board of Education makes some 
mention of the fact that the initial brief of the State 
Road Commission in this cause, fails to take in to ac-
count statutory legislation of the State of Utah, spe-
cifically, Title 78, Chapter 34, Section 1, et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated 19 53; that this legislation is to be 
considered as directly in point and bearing upon the 
issues of whether or not compensation must be paid by 
one agency of state to another for the appropriation 
of public property for a different public use, said prop-
erty being held by the latter agency in a governmental 
capacity; that the absence of discussion by the State 
Road Commission in its brief of these statutes is a 
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fatal defect for which the ruling of the lower court 
should be sustained. Respondent proceeds in its brief, 
on page 3 thereof, with a purpose that serves nothing 
more than to take up space, to discuss various sections 
of the Utah Code dealing specially with eminent do-
main (78-34-1. et seq.) 'The apparent intent of re-
spondent was to indicate that the statutes dealing with 
the condemnation, by eminent domain processes, of 
private property should control in the case at bar. It 
is submitted that an analysis of these statutes reveals 
the blundering inaccuracy of this position and further 
evidences the fact that the Legislature intended and 
specifically provided that such laws have application 
only to the acquisition of private property. 
The State Road Commission, in its original brief, 
did not devote discussion to the statutes on eminent 
domain relating to the acquisition of private property 
for the elementary reason that such statutes have no 
connection with the instant situation. As support for 
this position, it is noted that 78-34-1. Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, sets forth the uses declared public 
in nature, and subject to the exercise of eminent do-
main. 78-34-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, lists the 
interests that may be acquired in property subject to 
eminent domain processes. 78-34-3, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, is conclusive on the point that the legis-
lative intent under Chapter 34 of Title 78, was di-
rected only toword the expropriation of private prop-
erty, for said section specifically delimits the operation 
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of Chapter 34 to acquisition of private property in-
terests. 
Said section provides in part: 
''The private property which may be 
taken under this chapter includes: 
* * * * 
" ( 6) All classes of private property not 
enumerated may be taken for public use when 
such taking is authorized by law." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 78-34-3 sets the reco:rd clear that Chap-
ter 34 of the Utah Code was enacted to supplement the 
declaration of policy in this State announced under 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which 
in turn states: 
"Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compen-
sation.'' 
The argument is not acceptable that the Board 
of Education in holding the Franklin School prop-
erty, fits within the meaning of 78-34-3, or any pro-
visions thereof, for the section, by definition and con-
text, has application and relates to property held by 
a private individual in a private capacity and to prop-
erty held and used by an agency of government in its 
private, proprietary and individual capacity; said sec-
tion further requires that compensation be paid for 
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property held by a private corporation, the use of 
which has been declared to be public in nature, to-wit, 
facilities of a privately owned public utility. In no 
event does 78-34-3, or any of its provisions, relate to 
public property held by a public ag~ncy pursuant to 
a governmental function and obligation. 
Chapter 34 of Title 78 of the Utah Code sets 
forth the rules of procedure governing the acquisition 
of private property by condemnation. in addition to 
proclaiming conditions precedent to the taking a pri-
vate property for a public improvement. It has no 
effect upon the appropriation of public property held 
in a public capacity, nor does it determine, in any 
manner, whether compensation shall be paid for the 
change in ·use of publicly owned property. It must be 
of some interest to note that the respondent herein, in 
its dissertation on the laws of Eminent Domain under 
Chapter 34, Title 78, fails to mention that 78-34-3 
thereof, restricts the operation of the entire Chapter 
34 to the expropriation of private property. This 
omission is conspicuous and some·w·hat revealing of 
the merits of respondent's argument. 
In arriving at a decision of what property consti-
tutes and comprises private property ·within the boun-
daries of Title 78, Chapter 34, reference is made to the 
arguments and authorities under Point I of the initial 
brief of the appellant herein. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the overwhelming weight of authority in 
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the United States supports the proposition that the 
property maintained by the Board of Education, other-
wise referred to as the Franklin School facility, is held 
in a governmental capacity and that such constitutes 
public property, as distinguished from private prop-
erty in the truest form. 
The State Road Commission does not advance 
the argument in this case that the Legislature may not 
provide for the transfer of compensation from one 
public agency to another for the use by the former 
agency of public property previously utilized by the 
latter. The Constitution and articles thereunder a:re 
regarded and interpreted in this state as a limitation 
upon the power of the Legislature and the Legislature 
may act so long as it does not contravene constitutional 
provisions. Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 
119 U. 104, 225 P. 2d 18; Scott v. Salt Lake County, 
58 U 25, 196 P. 1022; State of Utah v. Waldram, 
64 U. 406, 231 P. 431; 16 C. J. S. 189, Constitu-
tional Law, Sec. 70 (a). 
In point of fact, however, the Utah Legislature 
has not enacted legislation in respect to the issues raised 
in this appeal; and absent such legislation, there is no 
requirement, under law, that compensation be paid for 
the change in use of public property. A reading of the 
brief of the Board of Education results in the simple 
conclusion that it rests its case, in whole and in part, 
upon the esoteric theory that Chapter 34 of Title 78, 
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and the individual sections thereunder, are controlling 
in the case at bar. This result is supported neither by 
the most liberal rules of statutory construction nor by 
the statutes themselves, for 78-34-3 restricts the ap-
plication of Chapter 34 to private property particu-
larly, and neither Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution nor Chapter 34 of Title 78 allow for the 
payment of compensation from one public agency of 
state to another for the change in use of public prop-
erty held in a public or governmental capacity. 
POINT II. 
THE CASE CITED BY THE RESPON-
DENT IN ITS BRIEF DOES NOT BEAR 
UPON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE 
RAISED IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
The Board of Education, on page 11 of its brief, 
advocates that the case of State v. Cooper, 24 N. J. 
2 6 1, 3 1 A. 2 d 7 56, con trois the disposition of the in-
stant suit. Therein the Highway Department of the 
State of New Jersey sought to acquire a "public 
square", devoted to recreational utilization, for a high-
way facility, and the Supreme Court of Ne\V Jersey 
ruled that compensation was required. 
It should be queried whether or not the Cooper 
case is factually similar with the case presently before 
this Court? The quick and proper answer is, of course, 
in the negative, for the property held by the con-
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demnee, the Borough of Fort Lee, was for a private 
and proprietary use, and was not maintained o:r sus-
tained by the Borough in the execution of an inherent 
function of government. 
State v. Cooper is not indistinguishable from the 
case cited by the appellant in its initial brief on page 
11, the Village of Canajoharie, Claimant, v. the State 
of New York: 13 Misc. 2d 293~ 177 N.Y. S. 2d 799, 
Affirmed 8 App. Div. 2d 656, 184 N. Y. S. 2d 871. 
Both cases are explained upon the basis that the use 
of the property by the local public agency was one that 
was traditionally private and non-governmental. 
T'he respondent, in its discussion of the School 
District of the Borough of Speers v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, through its Highway Department, 
383 Pa. 205, 117 A. 2d 702, misses the mark when 
it cites the decision as awarding compensation for the 
taking of public property. Although the effect of the 
Pennsylvania decision is explored more completely in 
the initial brief of the appellant on pages 17 and 18, 
it is safe to say that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
after a determination that the HCommonwealth may 
take property of a political subdivision or agency with-
out payment therefor, the right to compensation in 
such cases being only a matter of grace or allowance by 
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the Legislature," rested its decision upon a particular 
statute requiring payment to all owners of property 
abutting a highway facility for proximity damages 
accruing thereto. 
The State of Utah has no comparable legislation 
and as has been pointed out heretofore, Chapter 34 of 
Title 78 of the Utah Code does not contain the salve 
and panacea advocated by the Board of Education. 
No statute or legislation in force in the State of Utah 
allows or provides for the payment for the change in 
use of public property held in a public capacity. 
The Board of Education cites not a single de-
cision within or without this jurisdiction wherein 
compensation was required for the appropriation of 
public property from a public agency acting and main-
taining such property in a public and sovereign capac-
ity. It remains to be the case that the respondent rests 
it5 presentation upon a chapter of the Utah Code 
which was enacted to control the appropriation of 
private property, statutes which have no relevancy to 
the issues raised herein, and which only compliment 
the restriction imposed by the Constitution, Article I, 
Section 22. 
CONCLUSION 
It is asserted and respectfully submitted that a 
finding of this Court is required, that compensation 
is not due said Board from the State Road Commis-
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sion, another agency of state, for the change in use of 
public property, referred to herein, as the Franklin 
School property. 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
REX J. HANSON, 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
I r .. ~Q~+~ W ~~ 
t-1' 1A--~ ra "'-~~ rrt.. ~ ~-" 
~~;~t. A-t~~~ ~:~f,~ 
l 
l 
I 
1 
I 
I ll 
I 
f 
I 
,1 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
